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There are no assurances. There is, rather, the virtual certainty 
that an agency chartered to protect ‘national security,’ cloaked 
in secrecy, and accountable to no one who does not share – or 
actively encourage – its conspiratorial mystique will continue to 
commit monstrous crimes…1 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
On December 14, 2017, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“CSIS” or “the 
service”) announced that it had reached an out-of-court settlement with five of its 
employees.2 The group of intelligence officers and analysts sued the service in July 
2017 alleging that racist, anti-Muslim, sexist, and homophobic discrimination and 
harassment were rampant among staff and supervisors, and was tolerated at the highest 
levels of the service.3 The allegations appeared to be corroborated by the findings of 
an informal internal investigation into CSIS’s Toronto Region office, which was 
released publicly in October 2017. The report exposed an internal culture at CSIS that 
included “misogynistic, offensive and inappropriate comments and jokes… and even 
bullying by colleagues and managers, which remained unchecked for years”.4 The 
                                                 
† The title of this article is borrowed from a comment of the same title published in 1977 in the American 
leftist magazine, The Progressive, after secret and redacted documents were obtained from the United 
States’ Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) pursuant to freedom of information litigation. The information 
revealed illegal and abusive conduct by the agency. The comment posited that spies who behave illegally 
do harm to the very purposes they are meant to serve. Such spies, the comment argued, are “guided by the 
most cynical contempt not just for our ‘enemies,’ real or imagined, but for our strictures, our rules, our 
principles, our values – and for us.” The implication is that “us” refers to the citizenry, for whom the rule 
of law and constitutional rights are established. 
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Toronto, Canada. The author is 
indebted to Mariam Sheikh for her unstinting research support. He also thanks Amrita Pal for additional 
research assistance and Kiran Kang for helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1 “Comment: The Spies Who Hate Us” The Progressive (October 1977) at 6–7. 
2 The Canadian Press, “Canada’s Spy Agency Reaches Settlement in Discrimination and Harassment 
Lawsuit”, CBC News (15 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>. 
3 Statement of Claim, John Doe #1, Jane Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3 and Jane Doe #2 and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Court File No T-1032-17, filed on July 13, 2017, Federal Court, 
Toronto [Claim]. 
4 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Workplace Climate Assessment – Toronto Region Office and 
Districts – Executive Summary (conducted between April 18 and June 23, 2017; Executive Summary of 
2018] THE SPIES WHO HATE US 161 
report noted that, within CSIS, “jokes and discriminatory comments are still being 
made with regards to ethnicity and the communities being monitored. There is still 
some bias against and a general lack of thoughtfulness towards cultural differences 
and sensitivities.”5 
 
In announcing the settlement of the civil claim, CSIS Director, David 
Vigneault, gave no specifics about the confidential terms, which presumably included 
significant financial compensation to the plaintiffs.6 Vigneault pledged that the service 
would work “to ensure that the behaviour of all employees reflects the CSIS Employee 
Code of Conduct principles of respect for democracy, respect for people, integrity, 
stewardship, and professional excellence.”7  
 
Falling back on formal policies did little to assuage concern that toxicity 
within CSIS was likely influencing the agency’s work in counter-terrorism 
operations.8 When read alongside the experiences of individuals and communities 
caught in the web of Canadian national security law and policy since September 11, 
2001 (hereinafter “9/11”), the allegations appeared to confirm the persistent 
complaints of Canadian Muslim communities about religious and ethnic profiling in 
national security practices, discrimination in counter-terrorism investigations, and 
overbroad suspicion and monitoring of Muslim communities and institutions. The 
essence of these grievances appeared to concord with the employees’ allegations 
concerning discriminatory attitudes and behaviour within the service. 
 
The employees’ allegations against CSIS come into yet clearer focus when 
assessed in light of the findings of the two commissions of inquiry that looked into the 
matters of Maher Arar,9 and Abdullah Almalki, Ahmad Abou El-Maati, and Muayyed 
                                                 
confidential report released to the public in October 2017), online: <https://csis.gc.ca/nwsrm/wca-2017-10-
26-en.php> [CSIS, “Workplace Climate Assessment”]. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Claim, supra note 3 at para 1. The claim itself sought $35 million total in general damages, special 
pecuniary damages, and aggravated Charter damages, in addition to “an amount to be determined” for 
“future and anticipated medial and out of pocket expenses”.  
7 CSIS, News Release, “Director Vigneault Statement Regarding Settlement of Civil Litigation” (14 
December 2017), online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-
service/news/2017/12/director_vigneaultstatementregardingsettlementofcivillitigation.html>. 
8 See statement by Laurentian University’s Gary Kinsman in Arshy Mann, “Here’s Why Allegations of 
CSIS’ Homophobia and Racism should Concern all Canadians”, Xtra (August 11, 2017):  “The work of 
people in CSIS is to identify certain individuals as being threats to national security and enemies of the 
country…This is bound to create an internal culture within those work settings that actually reproduces 
those types of prejudices and bigotry”, online: <https://www.dailyxtra.com>. 
9 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the 
Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (Ottawa: Public Works and Government 
Services Canada, 2006) at 14, online: <epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/206/301/pco-
bcp/commissions/maher_arar/07-09-13/www.ararcommission.ca/eng/AR_English.pdf> [Arar Inquiry]. 
162 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 69 
Nureddin.10 These innocent men were found to have been subjected to rendition to 
torture, with Canadian complicity, in the early years of the US war on terror.11 At least 
two salient features of those cases, now more than a decade past, continue to resonate: 
First, Canadian authorities were known to be working in very close cooperation with 
American counter-terrorism officials and were under tremendous pressure to 
cooperate on US terms; and secondly, Canadian intelligence officials made a series of 
false assumptions and demonstrated discriminatory attitudes in forming the basis for 
their suspicions, which were found not reasonable on the evidence in the 
circumstances. The same features were at play in Canada’s failings towards the former 
child prisoner, Omar Khadr, who was illegally interrogated by Canadian intelligence 
officers while detained at the US detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This 
combination of deference to US priorities, the “war on terror” ideology, and 
intelligence failures based at least in part on discriminatory assumptions, caused 
Canada to violate Charter rights and ruin lives. The impact was felt throughout the 
Canadian Muslim community. 
 
When Canada joined the US war on terror in the aftermath of the co-ordinated 
attacks on the twin towers and the Pentagon, it surrendered to a series of counter-
terrorism assumptions and goals that were primarily ideological and lacked 
definitional precision. After 9/11, the battle against “radical Islam” – whatever that 
meant – was adopted as the rationalizing discourse and primary frame for US counter-
terrorism policy and action. What was dangerous to the US was also presumed to be 
dangerous to Canada, and the idea that Islamic terrorism posed a lethal threat to 
Canada, both militarily and ideologically, took hold.12 The Liberal government, led by 
then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Justice Minister Anne McLellan, implemented 
the first anti-terrorism law in December 2001,13 followed shortly by an overhaul of 
immigration legislation in June 2002.14 The approach sought to, among other things, 
tighten up immigration, define “terrorism” offences, and expand criminal power into 
preventative action and the denial of habeas corpus based on suspicion.15 This 
framework has consistently guided Canadian national security policy, and it was 
                                                 
10 Public Safety Canada, Internal Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Abdullah 
Almalki, Ahmad Abou-Elmaati and Muayyed Nureddin (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services 
Canada, 2008) [Iacobucci Inquiry]. 
11 See Canada, Law and Government Division, “Extraordinary Rendition: International Law and the 
Prohibition of Torture”, by Laura Barnett, PRB 07-48E (Ottawa: Parliament of Canada, 17 July 2008).  
12 See Maureen Duffy, Turning the Kaleidoscope: Fractured Narratives and Altered Presumptions in Anti-
Terrorism Detention Practices (DCL Thesis, McGill University Institute of Comparative Law, 2012) 
(Montreal: McGill University Libraries, 2013) [Duffy, Turning the Kaleidoscope]. See also Piotr Cap, 
Legitimisation in Political Discourse: A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective on the Modern US War Rhetoric, 
2nd ed (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010). 
13 Anti-terrorism Act, SC 2001, c 41 [ATA 2001].  
14 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27.  
15 See Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011) at 279–381, 391–92, 395–96 [Roach, 9/11 Effect].  
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intensified and broadened with the adoption of new powers in the Anti-terrorism Act, 
2015.16 
 
Beneath the legislative framework is a normative framework constituting the 
ideology and value system of the security establishment – those with legal power to 
investigate and disrupt terrorism threats. The enemy in the war on terror is not 
conventional. In fact, the enemy is imprecise, ambiguous, and barely knowable.17 It 
could potentially be anyone who appears to hold certain types of belief. This has led 
to an emphasis on the markers of difference, and has bred fears of infiltration by an 
extremist “other”.18 For many, the war on terror was not just fought with bombs and 
guns, but also with ideas, language, and demography.19 Those who believe Muslims 
are overrunning western civilization, for instance, point to a combination of Islam’s 
alleged proclivity to extremism and the lack of shared values to justify scepticism that 
Muslims can comfortably integrate into western society.20 Issues of gender equality, 
freedom of expression, and the role of religion in public life are often cited as sites of 
irreconcilable conflict between the west and Islam.21 The correlation of religiosity, 
especially outward religious observance, with the likelihood of being a terrorist seems 
implicitly obvious, even if not true. Evidence does not support any such correlation, 
and actually suggests that religious knowledge and community can be a powerful 
antidote to extremism.22 
 
The gap between fact and stereotype about Muslims has made all the 
difference when it has mattered most. The cases of Maher Arar and others provide 
illustration of the interplay of discrimination and incompetence. Even good faith slips 
and errors can produce egregious discriminatory effects when they occur in conditions 
in which a particular type of person or group suffers stigma. Discrimination is always 
reciprocated with diminished trust. Thus, the seeds of abuse that were sown in the 
                                                 
16 Anti-terrorism Act, 2015, SC 2015, c 20 [ATA 2015]. This Act came into force on June 18, 2015. 
17 See Duffy, Turning the Kaleidoscope, supra note 12 at 48–49. 
18 See e.g. Cato, “Coming to America: The Weaponization of Immigration” (2007) 46:2 Washburn LJ 309 
at 313 (The author is identified as a “former Senior Counsel at the United States Department of Justice”, 
and argues that, “Immigration, secure borders, and terrorism are linked, not because all immigrants are 
terrorists, but because nearly all terrorists in the West have been immigrants. Terrorists have shrewdly 
manipulated the openness of the United States and exploited America's traditions of inclusion, invoking the 
compassion expressed in our laws to enable their crimes”). 
19 See Piotr Cap “Follow-ups in the US Anti-terrorist Discourse: Proposal for a Macro-Discursive Approach 
to Monologic Follow-up Sequences” (2015) 26:5 Discourse & Society 543 [Cap, “Follow-ups”]. 
20 See Richard Jackson, “Constructing Enemies: ‘Islamic Terrorism’ in Political and Academic Discourse” 
(2007) 42:3 Government and Opposition 394 [Jackson, “Constructing Enemies”]. 
21 See e.g. Sam Harris, “The Reality of Islam” (8 February 2006), Sam Harris (blog), online: 
<https://samharris.org/the-reality-of-islam/> (“Mainstream Islam itself represents an extremist rejection of 
intellectual honesty, gender equality, secular politics and genuine pluralism. The truth about Islam is as 
politically incorrect as it is terrifying: Islam is all fringe and no center”).  
22 Aziz Z Huq, “The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism” (2011) 89:4 
Tex L Rev 833 at 877–78; Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, American Muslim Poll: 
Participation, Priorities, and Facing Predjudice in the 2016 Election (March 2016) at 8, online: 
<https://www.ispu.org/public-policy/american-muslim-poll-2016/>. 
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early post-9/11 period produced a generation of Canadian Muslims who are deeply 
distrustful of CSIS, who do not believe Canada has been fair or just in its fight against 
terrorism, and who feel that they have been made to belong to a despised and targeted 
minority within Canadian society.23  
 
This article begins at Part II by summarizing the settled civil claim by the five 
CSIS employees and related materials which fill in the picture of a toxic workplace 
culture within the national spy service. Part III discusses the record of official 
misdeeds and highlights findings from the public inquiries that resonate and align with 
the allegations of workplace toxicity. Part IV summarizes recent empirical research 
demonstrating that there is a considerable degree of distrust of counter-terrorism 
policy and institutions, and fear of terror stigma, within Muslim communities across 
the country. Finally, Part V describes and analyses legislative reform in national 
security, notably the Conservative government’s controversial enactment of new anti-
terrorism legislation in 2015, and the Liberal government’s subsequent efforts to 
amend parts of it. It highlights that Canada’s current national security consensus is that 
building collaborative relationships with targeted communities is a critical component 
of preventing threats. The article concludes by returning to this fundamental paradox 
in Canadian counter-terrorism: On the one hand, experts and government agree that 
effective counter-terrorism requires constructive relationships between national 
security agencies and targeted communities, which can only function with trust and 
good faith. On the other hand, as a result of official errors and illegal conduct, the lack 
of political accountability or internal reform, and the failure to root out bias in 
operations, there remain formidable obstacles to cooperation between the national 
security agencies and Canadian Muslims.  
 
 
II. Blowing the Whistle on CSIS 
 
In the aftermath of the adoption of the ATA 2015 (which received royal assent on June 
18, 2015) and a federal election in October 2015, the new Liberal Prime Minister, 
Justin Trudeau promised “sunny ways” as he ended nearly 10 years of Conservative 
rule under Stephen Harper.24 Then, in July 2017, a group of five CSIS employees, 
including three Intelligence Officers and two Analysts, sued the service for $35 million 
in damages caused by years of alleged workplace toxicity. They claimed that 
harassment, discrimination, intimidation and abuse, including racist, sexist and 
homophobic remarks and attitudes, were rampant at all levels of the service.25 The 
statement of claim avoided divulging confidential information, as its focus was on 
workplace behaviour rather than investigative work. While all of the claimants were 
                                                 
23 See Patti Tamara Lenard & Baljit Nagra, “Public Safety Report: Muslim Community Concerns and 
Experiences Regarding Counter-Terrorism Legislation in Canada” in Kanishka Research Team, Securitizing 
Minority/Muslim Canadians: Evaluating the Impact of Counter-Terrorism, National Security and 
Immigration Policies Since 9/11 (University of Ottawa, 2016). 
24 “Justin Trudeau’s ‘Sunny Ways’ a Nod to Sir Wilfred Laurier” CBC News (20 October 2015), online: 
<www.cbc.ca/news>. 
 
25 Claim, supra note 3 at paras 10–11. 
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still employed with CSIS at the time that the proceeding was commenced, they were 
also all on medical leave for various reasons of mental and physical ailment caused by 
years of alleged workplace harassment and discrimination. 
 
The claim provides a fascinating glimpse into the internal culture of Canada’s 
highly secretive intelligence agency. Although containing unproven allegations mostly 
denied by the Attorney General of Canada, the substance of the suit deserves attention. 
The allegations represent factual claims by long-serving employees who banded 
together at considerable personal risk to blow the whistle on harassment and 
discrimination within the service in a year that was characterized by a global tidal 
wave of anti-harassment whistleblowing.26 This article does not seek to evaluate the 
legal merits of the specific allegations. The mere fact that such a case was brought is 
reason enough to study its content. The claim is summarized below as a means of 
drawing focus to the subjective voices of the claimants, who are most certainly now 
silenced by non-disclosure clauses in terms of settlement. While the claim may now 
be moot for the unnamed individuals, the relevance of its substance goes beyond the 
personal grievances of the claimants. The claim engages squarely the public interest. 
 
The employees’ allegations depict a national security agency rife with 
conduct and attitudes that are antithetical to official government policy, baseline 
workplace standards, and Canadian constitutional values. While the legal claim was 
never proven in court, as detailed below, its allegations are corroborated to a 
considerable degree by contemporaneous independent findings and to some degree by 
public admissions by the CSIS director himself. Because the workplace at issue is the 
one that leads national security intelligence gathering, and now exercises threat 
disruption powers under the ATA 2015, the allegations are directly pertinent to 
pressing issues of law and public policy. Read in light of the record of court and 
commissions of inquiry findings over the previous decade, the allegations appear to 
confirm that, when it comes to anti-Muslim bias and cultural incompetence, little has 
changed within Canada’s security agencies.  
 
 
(i) Bahira 
 
Bahira worked as an intelligence officer for 15 years, starting shortly after 9/11. In 
2004, she began wearing hijab (Muslim headscarf). She alleged that her appearance 
caused an “uproar” within the service, producing a “stirring of suspicion so intense 
that it exists today.”27 She claimed that she was questioned at length by her managers 
about how she could continue her duties as a spy while wearing hijab. The presumption 
seemed to be that being visibly Muslim would render her unable to perform the 
essential duties of her job.  
 
                                                 
26 For instance, the #MeToo movement, ignited in the weeks after the claim was filed, exposed pervasive 
sex discrimination and harassment in the entertainment industry, with similar revelations from other 
industries emanating thereafter. 
27 Claim, supra note 3 at para 57.  
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Bahira claimed that as a result of the service’s suspicions, she was directed 
to report all of her anticipated activities within the Muslim community, including 
attendances at mosques and social events, to her superiors. She described a meeting 
with the Director General of Personnel Services and representatives of Internal 
Security, who allegedly told her that some of her outside activities were incompatible 
with her official duties. When she disclosed her biweekly attendance at mosque and 
occasional monetary donations to Muslim charities, she alleged that she was told her 
security clearance could be revoked for associating with certain individuals or groups 
in the Canadian Muslim community who were perceived to be adverse in interest to 
CSIS.28  She claimed she was ordered in writing to cease all associations with two 
prominent Muslim groups that were described to be “antithetical to CSIS’ work”.29 
The Statement of Defence did not deny these allegations, characterizing “any direction 
given to Bahira… [as] reasonable, justified and consistent with Service policies.”30 As 
a result of this pressure, Bahira alleged that she diminished her involvement in Muslim 
religious and social events in order to preserve her career.31  
 
Yet, it appeared that modifying her off-work behaviour did not cause the 
cloud of suspicion to dissipate. Instead, she alleged that she continued to endure 
constant discrimination, including the denial of opportunities for advancement, regular 
taunts by colleagues and superiors, and interference in her personal life by superiors 
solely on account of her religion.32 One particular manager, “William”,33 allegedly 
told Bahira that he distrusted her on account of her religion because she might one day 
leave the service and divulge its methods to members of the Canadian Muslim 
community. When she complained to the Director General, he allegedly rationalized 
William’s comments, suggesting that security threats emanate from second and third 
generation Canadian Muslims like Bahira. This confirmed to her that the official 
attitude in the office was that “all Muslims are suspect, and while they will appear to 
blend in, they could strike at any time.”34  
 
Bahira alleged that although she never gave the service any reason to doubt 
her commitment to the work of the service, her loyalty was not appreciated. In her 
performance assessment in 2004 – the year she adopted the hijab – William changed 
one of her supervisor’s 4 out of 4 ratings to 1 out of 4 for no reason. Bahira alleged 
that shortly after that, she was abruptly transferred out of the Counter-Terrorism 
branch and into Counter-Intelligence, where she had no experience.35 She worried that 
                                                 
28 Ibid at para 64. 
29 Ibid at para 65. 
 
30 Statement of Defence, John Doe #1, Jane Doe #1, John Doe #2, John Doe #3 and Jane Doe #2 and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada, Court File No. T-1032-17, Federal Court, Toronto at para 41 
[Defence]. 
31 Claim, supra note 3 at para 65. 
 
32 Ibid at para 54. 
 
33 Pseudonym used in Claim. 
34 Claim, supra note 3 at para 63. 
 
35 Ibid at paras 66–67. 
2018] THE SPIES WHO HATE US 167 
this created the impression that she had done something wrong and was not trusted by 
managers. 
 
Bahira’s feeling that she was being targeted for differential treatment 
increased in 2005 when she alleged that she was asked to attend an interview and take 
a polygraph test.36 While this sort of testing is routine for obtaining or renewing an 
individual’s security clearance, Bahira alleged that her clearance was not up for review 
until 2007. She was given no reason as to why she was being reviewed two years early. 
Bahira’s interview turned into a 10-hour interrogation about her involvement in the 
Muslim community. She alleged she was asked about her family, her decision to wear 
hijab, her prayer habits, and her personal views about the conflict in Afghanistan, 
suicide bombing, and the Muslim Brotherhood. She believed at the time that the 
service was looking for a reason to revoke her security clearance and terminate her 
employment.  
 
In 2005, Bahira filed an unofficial complaint about William and another 
manager in which she outlined her experience of discrimination and harassment, 
noting numerous other employees with similar experiences. The service allegedly 
responded by stating that management had full confidence in the quality of its cross-
cultural training.37 These words seemed hollow when a false rumour began circulating 
that Bahira was “friends” with Omar Khadr’s family.38 One colleague told Bahira that 
she had stopped speaking to her for three years because she believed the rumour to be 
true.39 It appeared that the only basis for the rumour was the fact that Bahira, like the 
Khadr family, was Muslim.  
 
Bahira eventually found herself again under William’s authority. She alleged 
that he deliberately stymied her career by routinely dismissing her initiatives and 
blocking her training opportunities.40  She alleged that “anti-Islamic comments and 
views were commonplace” in the office. One of her colleagues allegedly displayed a 
cartoon depicting a dog in Arab garb with the caption, “Prophet Mohammed of Islam 
is a dog and Jerusalem is ours”.41 A supervisor allegedly told her that “Muslim women 
are inferior” and that then-US President Barack Obama was a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.42 She claimed to never have reported these incidents to managers 
because she had no confidence they would be taken seriously.43 
 
                                                 
36 Ibid at para 69. 
 
37 Ibid at para 70. 
38 Ibid at para 76. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid at para 79. 
41 Ibid at para 55. 
42 Ibid at para 86. 
43 Ibid. 
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By late 2016, colleagues began to communicate more openly with one 
another about discrimination and harassment in the workplace. Bahira had believed in 
her work, had committed personal sacrifices for the service, but decided she could no 
longer continue under intolerable conditions that showed little potential for change. In 
January 2017, Bahira went on sick leave and filed a complaint alleging religious and 
ethnic harassment.44 She never returned to work at CSIS. 
 
 
(ii) Alex 
 
Alex, a gay man with a Muslim spouse, alleged a decade of ongoing homophobic and 
Islamophobic harassment and ridicule in the Toronto Region CSIS office, where he 
worked as an Intelligence Officer.45 He alleged that members of management 
frequently demeaned his sexuality in day-to-day communications and made 
derogatory comments about Muslims, which he took personally on account of having 
a Muslim spouse.46 In a 2014 meeting with all staff present, a manager allegedly joked 
that Alex “[took] it from behind”.47 Managers allegedly even called him names like 
“fag” or “gay boy” to his face, while one manager said to him, “careful your Muslim 
in-laws don’t behead you in your sleep for being homo.”48  
 
In June 2016, Alex filed a harassment complaint pursuant to CSIS’s internal 
Resolution of Harassment Complaints Procedure. In its Statement of Defence, the 
Attorney General admitted that Alex brought a harassment complaint for 
“inappropriate language in informal communications”, and stated that the service 
appointed an independent third-party investigator who upheld Alex’s complaint.49 The 
outside investigator found that the workplace culture was like an “old boy’s club”.50 
There was pervasive fear of reprisal for raising discrimination and harassment issues, 
as managers largely disregarded complaints.51 The report also found that this culture 
included regular consumption of alcohol in the office and discriminatory teasing.52 
 
Although the independent investigator’s report into Alex’s complaint is not 
public, the service provided a copy to Alex, and it is cited at length in the Claim. The 
investigator interviewed numerous witnesses – other employees at CSIS’ Toronto 
Region Office – who were reported to have made the following observations to the 
investigator: 
                                                 
44 Ibid at paras 92–96. 
45 Ibid at para 13. 
46 Ibid at para 14. 
47 Ibid at para 16. 
 
48 Ibid at para 15. 
49 Defence, supra note 30 at paras 25–27. 
 
50 Claim, supra note 3 at para 39. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
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“…there is racism, discrimination and harassment in TR [Toronto 
Region] and the Service… people get away with disrespecting and 
bullying minorities” […] 
“Big fear here is reprisals; peoples’ lives are at risk because of drunken 
decisions” […] 
“People are afraid to speak up; like hiding under [a] veil of secrecy and 
getting away with stuff” […] 
“The public would be shocked… if they only knew; we keep our own 
secrets”53  
 
The observations the investigator heard as a result of the interviews 
conducted into Alex’s complaint would be echoed in a later assessment of the 
workplace climate at the Toronto Region office, discussed below. None of these 
allegations were denied in the Defence, and ultimately the CSIS director offered a 
general public statement that was not a denial and which admitted that the workplace 
climate needed improvement.54 
 
 
(iii) Cemal 
 
Cemal was a Muslim analyst with 22 years’ service with CSIS when he joined the 
claim. He described the workplace as “hostile and toxic” to Muslims and other 
minorities. He described his perception that, “it is a deeply ingrained prejudice of 
distrust for Muslims which has meant that Muslims are used and managed as needed, 
but are not part of the team.”55 Cemal claimed that in the office there was a poster 
prominently hung depicting the “Ninety-Nine Names of Allah” (holy to Muslims) with 
a picture of the burning twin towers of the World Trade Center taped to it.56 He claimed 
to have once overheard a supervisor brag that she had rejected job candidates due to 
their Muslim sounding names, and on another occasion heard a manager tell an 
employee, “If you don’t like things in Canada, you should return to your country”.57  
 
The anti-Muslim tone in the office affected Cemal’s work. In 2006, he alleged 
that he noticed he was not given access to files, despite the fact that his unit was 
overloaded. Upon speaking with colleagues, he learned that he was being denied 
access to certain files because management viewed him with suspicion because he was 
a Muslim.58 He alleged that the cloud of suspicion prevented him from advancing in 
the ranks of the service, noting that in 22 years of service, he pursued at least 10 
                                                 
53 Ibid at para 42. 
54 Workplace Climate Assessment, supra note 4; see also admissions by CSIS Director Vigneault in 
Matthew Dubé, “Liberals Must End the ‘Old Boys’ Club’ Culture of CSIS” (26 October 2017), NDP 
Newsroom (website), online: http://www.ndp.ca/news/liberals-must-end-old-boys-club-culture-csis  [Dubé, 
“Must End the ‘Old Boys’ Club’ Culture”]. 
 
55 Claim, supra note 3 at para 98. 
56 Ibid at para 99. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid at para 100. 
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opportunities for advancement and was only ever successful in a single temporary 
post.59 He initially believed that he could be successful if he worked hard and 
improved, but with time, he noticed employees with considerably less service than him 
surpassing him in rank. He had spent his entire career in a non-supervisory position.60 
 
In 2016, as revelations about CSIS’ internal culture were surfacing, Cemal 
spoke with Alex. He learned from Alex that the Deputy Director General of the 
Toronto Region, the Toronto Region Deputy Chief of Counter-Terrorism, the Toronto 
Region Deputy Director General of Corporate Services, and several other Toronto 
managers, regularly referred to him as “Muslim Brotherhood”.61 Alex also confirmed 
to Cemal what he had long suspected: sometime in 2007–2010, during a high-profile 
CSIS investigation, two senior managers allegedly told Alex and other employees that 
“[w]e cannot trust [Cemal], since he was part of that community and socialized with 
our targets’ friends.”62 
 
Cemal alleged that, in December 2016, a senior manager launched an 
investigation into his work performance and attendance,63 including an audit of 
Cemal’s internet browser history. He claimed that this was highly unusual, invidious 
treatment. He was aware that there were only two other internet audits conducted in 
the Toronto Region office and both were Muslim employees.64 The investigation left 
Cemal devastated, and he filed an internal complaint of discrimination.65 He could no 
longer endure the workplace.66 Diagnosed with stress, anxiety, and depression, in 
January 2017, Cemal went on medical leave and never returned to work at CSIS.67 
 
 
(iv) Emran 
 
Emran was an analyst of Moroccan Muslim background who worked for CSIS for 12 
years, beginning in 2005. Emran alleged that he experienced constant harassment, 
isolation and ridicule within CSIS throughout his career on the basis of his Arab 
Muslim background. The claim described his role within CSIS as a paradox: “he is 
both a necessary tool to CSIS and the work it seeks to do, and at the same time he is 
                                                 
59 Ibid at para 105. 
60 Ibid at para 113. 
61 Ibid at para 119. 
62 Ibid at para 120. 
63 Ibid at para 122. 
64 Ibid at para 123. 
65 Ibid at para 125. 
66 Ibid at para 121. 
67 Ibid at para 127. 
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not trusted by many powerful individuals in the organization”, because he fits a 
profile.68  
 
When assigned to a new manager, William (presumably the same William 
detailed in Bahira’s claim), Emran claimed he immediately faced suspicion because 
of his ethnic and religious background. He alleged that William persisted in spreading 
false rumours that Emran was a mole. This had the effect of making his colleagues 
suspicious of him, and he suffered isolation as a result. Moreover, he claims to have 
endured repeated taunts and jabs from colleagues and managers, including “Watch out 
for the Moroccan spy”, “All Muslims are blood thirsty murderers”, and “All Muslims 
are terrorists”.69 
 
On an international posting in 2011, Emran’s new manager, Jeff, was 
allegedly openly hostile to Muslims and Arabs, making no secret of his contempt for 
Emran. Near the beginning of his posting, Emran alleged that Jeff told him, “I want 
you to take care of the liaison with the ‘Sand Monkeys’ because you are one of theirs 
and you speak their language”.70 He claimed that Jeff routinely referred to him and 
other Arabs and Muslims as “Useless Sand Monkeys”.71  
 
When he returned to Canada in 2013, Emran reported his claims of 
harassment but received no support from his superiors. He further alleged that when 
he encountered two senior managers in an elevator, one said to the other, referring to 
Emran, “I’m gunna fucking target this guy and the director said he won’t oppose it”.72 
In the period that followed, Emran alleged that the workplace became increasingly 
difficult for him to endure. Untrue rumours swirled that he was a “sexual deviant” and 
was “dangerous”, which he alleged severely impacted his sense of personal security.  
 
In 2014, Emran took off several months for mental health recovery. 
Returning to work later that year, he alleged that he continued to face hostility from 
his colleagues and career obstructions from his managers.73 In September 2016, Emran 
again went on medical leave due to the stress, anxiety and depression caused by his 
frustration with workplace discrimination and the unyielding cloud of suspicion on 
account of his Arab and Muslim identity.74 In January 2017, after Alex initiated his 
complaint, Emran claimed that he was contacted by a former supervisor who warned 
him against filing a complaint, saying, “You will suffer more, believe me. Not the kind 
of people you want to go against”.75 Emran alleged that a manager contacted him 
                                                 
68 Ibid at para 129. 
69 Ibid at paras 132, 133, 135, 137. 
70 Ibid at para 140. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid at para 145. 
73 Ibid at paras 149–150. 
74 Ibid at para 155. 
75 Ibid at para 156. 
172 UNBLJ    RD UN-B [VOL/TOME 69 
multiple times on the same day asking him to return to work, promising there were 
“promotions coming” and that he would have “his choice of foreign postings”.76 
Emran never returned to work at CSIS. 
 
 
(v) Dina 
 
Dina was hired as an Intelligence Officer with CSIS in 2001. She is Francophone and 
claimed to be the first black woman to work at CSIS. She is not Muslim. She alleged 
that, while she was well nurtured and supported early in her career, she became the 
subject of sustained harassment and discriminatory treatment by her colleagues, 
superiors, and subordinates when she assumed supervisory duties. The claim alleged 
that, from the time she was promoted to supervisor level, her managers treated her 
with hostility and resentment. She claimed they did everything they could to 
undermine her authority in the workplace and poison the attitudes of those working 
under her supervision.77 For nearly a decade, Dina battled the stereotype that she did 
not deserve her job and that she was only promoted as a “token” because of her race.  
 
Dina alleged that the undermining of her authority made her vulnerable to 
bullying by those she supervised. In June 2016, Dina filed a complaint against one of 
her subordinates, who had allegedly challenged Dina’s authority, told her that no one 
likes her, and yelled at her in front of her subordinates.78 She alleged that managers 
encouraged her to drop her harassment complaint and instead to pursue a misconduct 
investigation, which management subsequently dismissed as unfounded.79 She was 
then moved to a new branch, despite Dina’s concerns that her reputation had been 
damaged.80 Indeed, on arrival at her new job, Dina claimed to have learned that three 
individuals who were reporting to her had sought a transfer after becoming aware that 
she would be their supervisor. The harm her managers did to her reputation followed 
her in this new role.81 In 2016, she learned that Alex had filed a harassment complaint, 
which gave her the courage to talk about her own discrimination. She claimed that 
Alex confirmed her worst fears about her reputation in the workplace. Senior managers 
in Toronto allegedly openly referred to her as “the problem”.82 
 
Devastated by the revelations that her managers were against her, she realized 
that she could not continue in her job. In January 2017, she went off work due to the 
psychological and emotional impact of discrimination. She never returned to CSIS. 
 
                                                 
76 Ibid at para 157. 
77 Ibid at paras 160–163. 
78 Ibid at para 167. 
79 Ibid at paras 170–172. 
 
80 Ibid at para 172. 
81 Ibid at para 173. 
82 Ibid at para 175. 
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CSIS ‘Workplace Climate Assessment’ and public admission 
 
In March 2017, just a few months before the employees’ civil claim was filed, but at 
a time when the service was aware of the allegations,83 Michel Coulombe announced 
his retirement from his post as CSIS Director, which he had held since 2013. Prime 
Minister Trudeau named David Vigneault the new Director. Vigneault had not come 
up as a spy, but rather had been an executive assistant to the Deputy Minister of the 
Department of National Defence during the Chrétien Liberal era. He had also worked 
for the Communications Security Establishment (CSE), CSIS, the Canada Border 
Services Agency (CBSA) and, most recently, the Privy Council Office.  
 
In the period between the announcement of Coulombe’s retirement and 
Vigneault’s start date in June 2017, CSIS conducted a workplace climate assessment 
study into the Toronto Regional Office and Districts.84 A climate assessment is an 
informal and confidential procedure to collect information and reach conclusions 
about workplace issues without conducting a formal investigation or making orders. 
The process consisted of anonymous interviews with an undisclosed number of 
employees and managers from various units and sections within the Toronto region 
office. While the assessment was not formally linked to the issues raised in the claim, 
which was commenced one month after the climate assessment was completed, the 
claim alleges information began swirling in late 2016 (when the claimants learned 
about each other and began pushing for accountability). Thus, at the time the decision 
to conduct the workplace climate assessment was taken, CSIS was presumably already 
aware of general workplace concerns about harassment and discrimination and 
possessed specific knowledge about the claimants’ allegations. Indeed, by January 
2017, all of the claimants were off work on medical leave as a result of the stress of 
having tried and failed to have their grievances addressed. The workplace climate 
assessment was conducted between April and June, 2017.  
 
The findings of the report confirmed allegations made by the five claimants. 
It described a culture of bullying, reprisal, discrimination, and harassment based on 
religion, ethnicity, sex and sexuality. It noted, for example, that there are “some 
pockets where jokes and discriminatory comments are still being made with regards 
to ethnicity and communities being monitored. There is still some bias against women 
and a general lack of thoughtfulness toward cultural differences and sensitivities.”85 
The report also noted that career advancement was “solely based on relationships and 
not competencies or experience”, and many workplace decisions were made during 
drinking sessions with the “in” group.  The report echoed the internal investigation 
describing the Toronto CSIS office as an “old boys’ club climate” with frequent 
“yelling, swearing, disrespectful, demeaning, misogynistic, offensive and 
                                                 
83 See Michelle Shephard, “Head of Spy Agency CSIS Admits ‘Retribution, Favouritism, Bullying’ in 
Workplace” The Toronto Star (25 October 2017), online: <https://www.thestar.com> (reporting that CSIS 
was aware of the allegations “months” before the claim was filed) [Shephard, “Head of Spy Agency”]. 
84 Workplace Climate Assessment, supra note 4. 
 
85 Ibid. 
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inappropriate comments and jokes about employees from other employees but also 
managers.”86 
 
The report was not made public immediately. Thus, the claim filed in July 
2017 was the first public glimpse into the allegations of racism, Islamophobia, and 
homophobia by staff and managers within the service. Canadians had never before 
heard such details about the inner CSIS culture, though there was some basis to infer 
as much from the findings of the Arar and Iacobucci inquiries. The day after the claim 
was filed, two former CSIS employees, Francois Lavigne and Michel Juneau-Katsuya, 
told the CBC they were not surprised by the allegations in the claim. Lavigne said that 
in his time with the service, homophobia and discrimination against minorities was 
rampant, and it was part of the culture to keep quiet when witnessing it. He too said 
that it works like an “old boys’” network: “If you’re part of the group, then you shut 
your mouth and you don’t say anything…. That’s part of the culture.” Juneau-Katsuya 
described bias and discrimination within the service as a “systemic problem”.87 
 
The September case conference was not reported in the press until October 
24, 2017, when the transcript of the case conference was filed in Federal Court. The 
transcript describes Department of Justice lawyers asserting that the government was 
attempting to reach a resolution with the claimants.88 This might explain why it was 
reluctant to file a defence. The day after the transcript was released, Vigneault publicly 
admitted that the service was operating a workplace in which “retribution, favouritism, 
bullying and other problems” were standard practice.89 He did not specifically address 
the claim, but the implications were clear. Vigneault released a partially redacted 
executive summary of the workplace climate assessment report that had been 
completed in June 2017. Both the timing of Vigneault’s admission and the substance 
of the investigator’s findings provided objective validation of many of the claimants’ 
allegations, and the claimants credited their case for prompting Vigneault’s public 
admission. The public safety critic for the federal New Democratic Party (NDP) 
described the report’s findings as “shocking” and called on the Minister to take 
“concrete actions” and to “immediately launch a comprehensive and credible 
investigation into claims of rampant and persistent discrimination within CSIS and the 
impacts it has on employees’ working conditions, and on the quality of work 
produced.”90 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 Shanifa Nasser, “Veil of Secrecy Prevents CSIS Employees from Speaking Out, Say Ex-Officers”, CBC 
News (14 July 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>.  
88 See Michelle Shephard, “Judge Slams Ottawa for Delays Over $35-million CSIS Lawsuit Alleging 
Workplace Islamophobia, Racism, and Homophobia”, The Toronto Star (24 October 2017), online: 
<https://www.thestar.com>. 
89 Shephard, “Head of Spy Agency”, supra note 83. 
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The Defence 
 
The Liberal Party of Canada’s 2015 election platform promised to “build a government 
as diverse as Canada.”91 That promise manifested in the most multicultural and 
representative House of Commons ever, as well as a Cabinet that aspired to reflect the 
people it represents. Yet, the new government inherited an antiquated national security 
intelligence service. The Canadian Human Rights Commission conducted 
employment equity audits of CSIS in 2011 and 2014.92 The 2014 CHRC Report found 
that visible minorities and indigenous people were under-represented and faced 
“attitudinal barriers”, inadequate support, and a lack of training necessary to advance 
into management.93 The conclusions were both shocking and predictable: visible 
minority representation in senior management was nil94 at a time when around one in 
five Canadians was a visible minority.95 The report also highlighted that only 17% of 
senior managers in CSIS were women, a decrease of 13 per cent since 2009. The report 
pointed to the institutional culture, undervalued minorities and women, and 
reproduced attitudinal barriers as the reason so few women and minorities were being 
hired or promoted in the organization. CSIS was evidently one of the least diverse 
agencies within the public service. 
 
The government’s Statement of Defence to the civil claim was sparse, and it 
avoided getting into the merits of the allegations. It contained blanket denials of the 
claim, and it restated the official position that CSIS is “committed to providing a 
healthy and respectful workplace of inclusion, where diversity is representative of its 
strength.”96 It alleged that CSIS does not tolerate “harassment, discrimination or 
bullying under any circumstances” and referenced its Employee Code of Conduct and 
the service’s policy on building a Safe, Healthy and Respectful Workplace, as 
indicators of the institutional commitment to inclusion.97 
 
                                                 
91 Aaron Wherry, “How the Federal Government is Slowly Becoming as Diverse as Canada”, CBC News 
(29 December 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news>.  
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93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid.  
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While the Attorney General admitted “inappropriate language” was used in 
informal communications between employees in the Toronto region,98 the defence 
denied that the service “perpetrated or tolerated religious bigotry or religious 
sensitivity in the workplace”, or that there was a culture of reprisal against those raising 
complaints.99 The Crown pointed out that each plaintiff raised “disparate, unrelated 
allegations”, and claimed that each had been addressed by the service through 
appropriate procedures.100 There were no particulars given as to what the service 
considered “appropriate” to address the allegations. 
 
Cases that settle out of court do not result in factual findings or public orders. 
They rarely include admissions of wrongdoing or public apologies. They might impact 
institutional behaviour, and while there is potential for it to result in internal 
accountability, none of this is certain, and little is publicly known about CSIS’ internal 
work. Because details about the terms of settlement are confidential, it is impossible 
to know whether the settlement was fair to the parties or was in the public interest. 
Unlike settlements, adjudicated decisions involve a full assessment of facts and 
produce binding, publicly disseminated conclusions. Damage awards and other forms 
of compensation are spelled out.  
 
The interests at play in civil cases make it highly unlikely that a case like the 
CSIS lawsuit would ever reach a trial. There is validity to the argument that 
confidential settlements concerning actors in the public service are unwarranted in 
circumstances such as these, where the public interest – and indeed the interests of 
national security – may demand greater transparency. Presumably, the public interest 
in the widely reported cases of Arar ($10 million101), Almalki et al. ($31.25 million 
split three ways102) and Khadr ($10.5 million103) motivated the decision to dispense 
with confidentiality over the financial terms of settlement. In the lesser-known case of 
Benatta, confidentiality was maintained when news of settlement was publicly 
announced in March 2015.104 
 
It is worth turning to the facts of these cases to better understand Canadian 
Muslim experiences with counter-terrorism in the post-9/11 period. 
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III. Official Misdeeds and Muslim Vulnerability 
 
This part summarizes a legacy of abuse that indelibly coloured the Canadian Muslim 
experience with, and perception of, counter-terrorism policy and action after 9/11. It 
contextualizes the opinions of Canadian Muslims and argues that the effect of a war 
on terror that was seen by many to be a global war on Muslims produced domestic 
scapegoating that exacted considerable costs. Those costs included heightened social 
and political vulnerability for Canadian Muslims and their concomitant loss of faith in 
CSIS.  
 
In 2001, the Canadian security establishment knew virtually nothing about 
the threats posed by global radical Islamic political movements.105 CSIS’ focus on 
Muslims was largely spurred by pressure from the US to keep up with its “aggressive 
approach” in the war on terror.106 Indeed, from the very beginning, Canada’s national 
security policy and anti-terrorism legislation was shaped by US policy and 
discourse.107 Speaking on Parliament Hill three days after 9/11, Prime Minister 
Chrétien told the US ambassador that the countries’ “friendship has no limit”, 
affirming Canada’s loyalty, pledging that “we will be with the United States every step 
of the way.”108 Within two weeks of Chrétien’s speech, a British intelligence report 
outlining the case against al Qaeda was adopted by Canada and the US.109 Before the 
end of the year, the United States would adopt the PATRIOT Act (signed by the 
President on October 26, 2001),110 the United Kingdom would enact the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (received royal assent on December 14, 
2001),111 and Canada’s Parliament would pass the Anti-terrorism Act (received royal 
assent on December 18, 2001).112 
 
When the ATA 2001 came into force, then-Justice Minister Anne McLellan 
reassured Canadians that the law “is not a war against any one group or ethnicity but 
against terrorism” and that “[d]iversity is one of Canada’s great strengths and we are 
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taking measures to protect it.”113 Both of these claims would be seriously tested in the 
weeks and years to come. By late 2001, Canadian Special Forces were in Afghanistan 
alongside American troops – a secret that only came to light through media leaks.114 
As Canada joined the US war in Afghanistan, evidence of anti-Muslim backlash began 
to appear, prompting then-Finance Minister, Paul Martin, to acknowledge “acts of 
intolerance within our own country” and to express concern for “[i]ndividuals… 
targeted because of the colour of their skin or the practice of their faith.”115 In addition 
to the social ramifications of the war on terror, political leaders at the time failed to 
realize that the tendency to scapegoat Muslims would take hold within the very 
institutions that were charged with ensuring national security. While advocacy groups 
within the Canadian Muslim community complained about CSIS’ over-zealousness, 
the cascading effects of social stigma, hate crimes, and discrimination accumulated.116  
 
 
Collusion in Rendition 
 
In the immediate months after 9/11, the RCMP created Project A-O, an investigative 
unit looking into the activities of Ottawa resident, Abdullah Almalki, who was 
suspected of being associated with Al Qaeda.117 The project was also tasked with 
investigating any leads about the threat of a second wave of 9/11 style attacks.118 This 
investigation ultimately was responsible for the rendition to Syria and the subsequent 
torture of at least four Canadian Muslim men. In all cases, the trigger was a piece of 
information later determined to be false or unreliable.119 Moreover, the information on 
which CSIS and the RCMP operated appeared to be motivated by a hardline “war on 
terror” mindset.120  
 
The most well-known of the cases concerned Maher Arar, a naturalized 
citizen who, with Canadian assistance, was illegally transferred in 2002 by the US to 
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Syria, where he was tortured for nearly a year.121 It was later revealed that false 
assumptions about his associations within Ottawa’s Muslim community had turned an 
innocent man into a suspected terrorist. Information disclosed in the course of the 
public inquiry implicated Canadian officials in poor intelligence work and the 
production of misinformation.122  
 
Even after Arar returned to Canada, the Commission of Inquiry found that 
some government officials leaked information to the media, seeking to portray Arar as 
someone who had been involved in terrorist activities.123 The RCMP were found to 
have leaked false information to portray Arar as someone who was never tortured and 
had gone to Syria voluntarily.124 Arar was later cleared of any association with 
terrorism, and received a multi-million dollar settlement and an official apology from 
the Prime Minister.125 Even so, the damage had been done and the spectre of official 
suspicion followed him.126 The Inquiry noted that the leaks of false and damaging 
information about him “contributed to his ongoing difficulty in finding gainful 
employment in his field.”127 
 
The Commission of Inquiry paid special attention to harm caused by mere 
allegations of suspected “Islamic extremist” and “jihadist”. It warned that such terms 
invite findings of guilt by association.128 The Inquiry found that the investigation’s 
“major shortcoming was that, with few exceptions, the officers assigned to Project A-
O… lacked experience and training in conducting national security investigations and 
in addressing human rights and cultural sensitivity issues that might arise in such 
investigations.”129 The Report recommended clear, written policies against profiling 
because “race, religion or ethnicity… may expose [individuals] to investigation.”130 
The findings showed how a series of inter-dependent decisions across jurisdictions, 
without any meaningful mechanism for fact-checking or internal review,131 could 
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combine to produce grave consequences. For example, the Commission concluded that 
Arar and his wife had been incorrectly flagged by security agencies as “Islamic 
extremists” with links to al Qaeda, despite no factual basis for this link.132 In the war 
on terror, false information could morph into fact, and then be reproduced uncritically 
through secret information-sharing. This pattern repeated itself in numerous cases. 
 
Former Supreme Court Justice Frank Iacobucci was appointed to lead a 
Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Canadian officials in the cases of falsely 
fingered terrorists, Abdullah Almalki and Muayyed Nureddin, who were tortured in 
Syria, and Ahmad Abou El-Maati, who was tortured in Syria and Egypt. The Inquiry 
found that the unlawful treatment of these men was caused by an intelligence 
overreaction based on conjecture and associational suspicions. For example, the report 
noted with criticism that “CSIS did not describe Mr. Elmaati as a person “suspected” 
or “believed” to be involved in the Islamic extremist movement, but a person involved 
in the Islamic extremist movement.”133  In the case of Almalki, the report found the 
RCMP had described him as an “Islamic extremist” with ties to al Qaeda “without 
taking adequate measures to ensure that it was accurate, reliable or properly 
qualified.”134 
 
A less known rendition case is that of Benamar Benatta, an engineer and 
former military pilot who fled political upheavals in Algeria in search of a better life 
in Canada.135 He arrived at Niagara Falls on September 5, 2001, where he claimed 
asylum, and was detained for further questioning. On September 11, 2001, he was 
questioned by US authorities and then unlawfully transferred across the Canada-US 
border in the middle of the night. In US detention, he spent time in solitary 
confinement, was shackled, beaten, accused of being complicit in 9/11, and subjected 
to conditions described by the United Nations as akin to torture – all on the basis of 
misinformation provided by agents who, knowing their information was false, later 
allegedly tried to cover up their misconduct.136 After five years in detention and never 
having been charged with a crime,137 Benatta was set free to return to Canada where 
he was permitted to continue his claim for refugee status, which was ultimately 
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successful.138 In 2007, Benatta filed a civil law suit against Canada, which was settled 
in 2015 for an undisclosed amount.139 
 
Finally, the most notorious case is that of Omar Khadr. In May 2015, Khadr 
was released on bail – a free man after 13 years. The former child soldier and US 
“enemy combatant”140 captive had been convicted of “murder” in the death of an 
American soldier in a firefight in Afghanistan. Khadr spent a decade in detention at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where the US maintains a prison considered by experts to 
exist in a “legal black hole”.141 In 2008, the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously 
upheld a Federal Court of Appeal judgment ruling that the government had breached 
Khadr’s section 7 Charter rights by failing to turn over records related to his time in 
US captivity.142 The government argued that turning over the documents would 
imperil national security, but the facts suggested that Canada was trying to cover up 
misdeeds. Indeed, after the Court ordered the government to turn over the records, it 
ruled that CSIS’ interrogation of Khadr at Guantanamo Bay violated “the most basic 
Canadian standards” for treating youth criminal suspects.143 Despite this ruling, the 
Conservative government maintained that Khadr was a convicted murderer who 
should remain in prison, and delayed his release by several years.144 In 2013, Khadr 
filed a civil suit seeking $20 million in damages arising from Canadian cooperation in 
the violation of his constitutional rights.145  In 2017, the Attorney General issued a 
formal apology and settled to pay Khadr $10.5 million in compensation.146  
 
 
Good Muslim/Bad Muslim 
 
The legacy of Canada’s counter-terrorism failings and constitutional breaches is one 
that has cost Canadians millions in legal settlements and has exacted social costs too. 
The 2015 change in government was welcomed by many as a step towards rebuilding 
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trust between the government and the public. In particular, the hope was that a new 
government would refocus counter-terrorism efforts and reduce the perception that 
Muslims were being singled out for special and unfair scrutiny. Yet, the inherent 
paradox of Canada’s position with respect to national security remained: Canada could 
not offer both unconditional loyalty to the United States,147 whose aggressive war on 
terror gave the appearance of a war on Muslims,148 while at the same time maintaining 
Canada’s mosaic approach to multiculturalism and commitment to Charter rights, 
such as religious and expressive freedoms, and equality.149 The inevitable cost of this 
failed balancing act was heightened minority vulnerability, or scapegoating. 
 
Linguistic analyses of American counter-terrorism policy and rhetoric in the 
years after 9/11 demonstrate that political macro-discourse produced assumed 
associations between terrorism and Islam,150 deepening the “us” versus “them” 
dichotomy between “ordinary citizens” and Muslims.151 One scholar describes the 
“casting out” of Muslims from western law and politics in the years after 9/11.152 The 
factual record shows that in the first 15 years after 9/11, the Canadian Muslim 
population paid a higher cost on the whole for national security than any other group. 
The Iacobucci inquiry noted that in the early 2000s, CSIS had six priority areas, one 
of which was terrorism, and which was focused “primarily” on religious extremism153 
(i.e. Islamic extremism). The Arar Commission Report observed that, “[g]iven the 
tendency thus far of focusing national security investigations on members of the Arab 
and Muslim communities, the potential for infringement on the human rights of 
innocent Canadians within these groups is higher.”154 Indeed, Kent Roach notes that 
“the focus on intelligence create[s] an environment… more conducive to running the 
risk of false positives, by which people [are] wrongly identified as terrorists on the 
basis of their associations, politics, religion… as opposed to false negatives”.155  
 
Evidence suggests that even logically flawed political rhetoric can 
manipulate popular opinion into implicitly consenting to national security measures 
                                                 
147 It turned out there were at least some limits to Canada’s friendship, as Chrétien demonstrated in 2003 
when Canada went with the world and stood against the US invasion of Iraq. That was a decision with broad 
geopolitical implications and with overwhelming support internationally. However, when it came to national 
security at home and in border relations with the US, Canadian policy remained strongly tethered to its 
powerful southern neighbour. 
148 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies”, supra note 20 at 400. The perception that the US is at war with 
Muslims has only ratcheted up since the November 2016 election of Donald Trump as US President. 
149 See Faisal Bhabha, “Tracking 'Terrorists' or Solidifying Stereotypes? Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Act in 
Light of the Charter’s Equality Guarantee” (2003) 16 Windsor Rev Legal Soc Issues 95. 
150 Jackson, “Constructing Enemies”, supra note 20 at 404; Cap, “Follow-ups”, supra note 19 at 549–55. 
151 Cap, “Follow-ups”, supra note 19 at 556. 
152 See Sherene H Razack, Casting Out: The Eviction of Muslims from Western Law and Politics (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007). 
153 Iacobucci Inquiry, supra note 10 at 64. 
154 Arar Inquiry, supra note 9 at 324. 
155 Roach, 9/11 Effect, supra note 15 at 44. 
2018] THE SPIES WHO HATE US 183 
that cause the “fracturing of long-standing constitutional rights protections”.156 
Constitutional norms can slip away with the tacit endorsement of majoritarian will. 
The perception of aggressive counter-terrorism assuages public anxiety about public 
safety,157 but requires the public to be indifferent to rights violations. Research shows 
that, in fact, rights violations are largely ineffective – if not counter-productive158 – at 
controlling violence.159 Feeding public fear serves the function of justifying 
unmitigated deference to security agencies.160 Rights violations that are, or are 
perceived to be, an ordinary function of the system of law enforcement can drastically 
undermine public confidence in the rule of law and the administration of justice. 
However, maintaining the appearance of necessity can mitigate the adverse impact to 
the rule of law and public confidence in the administration of justice caused by 
minority rights violations. The harm that flows may not be perceptible to those who 
do not experience it. For example, while strengthening borders can translate into a real 
risk of exclusion or discriminatory scrutiny for some, it may only mean the 
inconvenience of removing shoes in airport security screening for others.  
 
A decade after the al Qaeda attacks on the US, in 2011, Prime Minister Harper 
told the CBC that “the major threat is still Islamicism”,161 despite the fact that there 
had never been an incident of Muslim terror in Canada. This marked Canada’s 
wholesale embrace of “fear-inducing and hyperbole-rich American political discourse 
on ‘porous’ United States borders in need of constant ‘securing’ and ‘smartening up’ 
against Islamist terrorism”.162 According to one columnist, Harper’s ideology was 
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“strengthening those waging a cultural war against Muslims and Islam across North 
America and Europe.”163  
 
Prime Minister Harper’s rhetoric, rooted in the “good Muslim/bad Muslim” 
frame, contributed to intense public discourse about Muslims. The toxic impact was 
exacerbated by the fact that digital readership of news media dramatically increased 
starting in 2010, with user comments often perceived as being part of news stories and 
playing an increasingly influential role in shaping public opinion.164 Analyses of user 
comments illustrate how the perception of Muslims constituting a threat within 
western civilization was propagated. The combination of media stories filtering 
Canadian Muslims through the security lens and online user-generated content tended 
to produce false and misleading information about Muslims, which in turn led to 
greater stigmatization.165 
 
The war on terror discourse was a centerpiece of the Harper government’s 
political platform. In the war on terror, enemy values were known to be rooted in 
idiosyncratic interpretations of core Islamic texts. On the surface, all believing 
Muslims were thus potential terrorists. “Islamo-fascism”, political Islam, or even 
simply “Islam” came to be blurred and portrayed as the enemy.166 Although all 
Muslims were not necessarily terrorists, those who shared ideas or beliefs with 
terrorists, even if not inclined to violence, were still terrorist sympathizers and could 
potentially provide moral support to terrorism or be eventually radicalized.167  
 
These implied categories of “us” and “them”, “good Muslim” and “bad 
Muslim”,168 suffered from terrible over-breadth and lack of precision. These categories 
came to be crucial to the counter-terrorism narrative as well. The political discourse 
that constructed the distrustful and violence-prone Muslim was generally amplified in 
media reporting.169 Islam itself became the subject of intense debate, often by non-
experts who shrouded their contempt for Muslim people in vitriol against an abstracted 
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“Islam”,170 as if the religion could be maligned without impacting its followers. A 
2006 public opinion poll found that 65 percent of Canadians were concerned that too 
many immigrants were not adopting “Canadian values”.171 Muslims were seen to 
reside outside the “common framework of ‘discursive citizenship’ based on a set of 
shared national values and were therefore in need of ‘cultural rehabilitation’ through 
the inculcation of Western values.”172 Any Canadian Muslim who appeared not to fit 
the mould of a “good Muslim” (that is, one who has been culturally rehabilitated) was 
presumed to be a “bad Muslim” (that is, one who sympathizes with extremism) and 
therefore a potential security threat. This binary in public discourse was equally 
reflected in government policy making with respect to counter-terrorism.  
 
 
Costs and Benefits: Security vs. Scapegoating 
 
The cost-benefit analysis in counter-terrorism law and policy is often described as a 
rights-security binary.173 However, as Wark argues, the metaphor of the “scales of 
justice”, with rights on one side and security on the other, suggests a dangerous “zero-
sum game: more rights means less security; more security means less rights.”174 While 
the dominant discourse readily accepts the rights-security binary, the disparate impact 
of such balancing forces vulnerable minorities to carry the burden of less rights, while 
accepting no guarantee of more security. With the costs of security disproportionately 
allocated, it is unsurprising that faith in fairness and the rule of law among Canadian 
Muslims is depressingly low.175 
 
There is a common presumption that counter-terrorism is an inherent good – 
it protects “us” (whom we know) from “them” (whom we fear).176 This presumption 
can only be defended in the most abstract sense. In truth, counter-terrorism rationales 
can be distorted to justify virtually any measures up to and including the wholesale 
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suspension of rights of innocent citizens in democratic countries.177 Governments tend 
to defer to the security agencies, and the public tend to defer to government policy 
choices when it comes to counter-terrorism. The cases and examples surveyed in this 
article suggest that high deference to the security agencies comes at a cost.   
 
While counter-terrorism strategies facially appear to be the product of 
rational choices, based on facts and reason, research reveals the reality that such 
decisions are usually driven by the exigencies and the politics of crisis.178 Considering 
that “the environment of crisis is the medium in which most, if not all, counterterrorism 
decisions are made”, it follows that political control and oversight of such decisions 
and actions diminishes during crisis.179 Even experts and policy makers can be 
expected to act irrationally when making counter-terrorism choices. This is because 
crisis produces uncertain information, unstable decisions, and unintended 
consequences.180 Citing the 1970 FLQ crisis as an example, and using organizational 
behaviour theory to analyze the state’s response to terrorism, Munroe observes that in 
the “climate of stress, fatigue, and uncertainty, exceptional powers were sought by the 
police as a way… to legalize operations either contemplated or already taking place, 
rather than being chosen by Cabinet from a range of policy options.”181 The danger of 
police-driven policy when there is limited oversight and review is diminished 
accountability.182 The result is that, “[d]ivergent forces in one’s own state 
machinery…become uncontrollable, exactly when control is most necessary.”183  
 
As Wark notes, the intelligence failures regarding the nature and quality of 
threats revealed on 9/11 created a crisis in the intelligence community that set 
processes in place that have determined the course of counter-terrorism efforts over 
the last 15 years. 184 Evaluating the benefit of those efforts is a difficult task. How does 
one count the number of possible crimes averted? There are “severe limits of 
                                                 
177 See e.g. Stuart Macdonald “Understanding Anti-Terrorism Policy: Values, Rationales and Principles” 
(2012) 34:2 Sydney L Rev 317 at 322–26. See also HD Munroe, “The October Crisis Revisited: 
Counterterrorism as Strategic Choice, Political Result, and Organizational Practice” (2009) 21:2 Terrorism 
& Political Violence 288 at 298. For example, in Canada, the War Measures Act was in force from 1914 to 
1988. National security was used to intern and dispossess German, Ukrainian, and Japanese Canadians 
during two world wars. It was also invoked in October 1970 after radical Quebecois nationalists kidnapped 
a foreign trade commissioner and Quebec’s Minister of Labour, Pierre Laporte, who they later murdered. 
Soldiers were deployed in the streets of Ottawa and Montreal and nearly 500 people were detained in the 
province of Quebec – most were ultimately released without charge. 
178 Munroe, supra note 177 at 301–02. 
179 Ibid at 301. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Ibid at 299. 
182 See also Andrea Wright “Fit for Purpose? Accountability Challenges and Paradoxes of Domestic 
Inquiries” in Hans Born, Ian Leigh & Aidan Wills, eds, International Intelligence Cooperation and 
Accountability (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011) at 170. 
183 Munroe, supra note 177 at 301. 
184 Wark, “Worth Repeating”, supra note 105 at 65. 
2018] THE SPIES WHO HATE US 187 
knowability” when it comes to counter-terrorism effectiveness.185 Nonetheless, 
governments must be “seen as doing something”; so, they perform “security 
theatre”.186 This often includes cultivating a climate of crisis and building 
constructions of “evil” and “war” that justify strong action, even if it is not rational or 
evidence-based.187 
 
From the public’s perspective, the tendency is to take it as a given that the 
government is in charge and the security agencies deliver some measure of security.188 
Defining what security specifically entails is an elusive task. Thus, trust becomes an 
essential element in the relationship between a democratic citizenry and the security 
establishment, especially given the balancing act between liberty and security. In 
democracies, studying official errors and misdeeds can only cure anti-democratic 
institutional practices if it leads to greater accountability. While democracies have 
limited tolerance for abuses of authority, abuses do happen and governments must be 
seen to be taking responsibility to assure the public that the abuses will not be repeated. 
Scholarly research and commission findings have highlighted that the siloed nature of 
information sharing within national security agencies and deficiencies in the 
relationships between review and oversight bodies and security agencies are in need 
of reform.189  Public reporting and democratic accountability operate together to 
maintain the appearance of transparency as well as providing a meaningful opportunity 
not only for internal review, but for the public to be aware of how systemic operational 
problems are being managed. 
 
The costs of human rights violations by the state are difficult to quantify. In 
addition to tens of millions of dollars paid out to victims, Canada’s global reputation 
and domestic rule of law both suffer. Public inquiries and court rulings expose the 
facts of abuse but do nothing, in and of themselves, to change the institutional culture 
that produces abuse. No individual from within CSIS or the RCMP has ever been 
publicly held to account for the abuses.190 Nor is there any publicly available 
information indicating that there has ever been disciplinary action within those 
agencies for actions leading to rendition and torture. Indeed, some of the Canadian 
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officials who leaked inaccurate information that permanently damaged Maher Arar’s 
reputation were themselves later promoted.191  
 
Notwithstanding the government’s significant settlements and public 
apologies, the lack of internal accountability projects a culture of impunity in Canadian 
security agencies that reinforces the concerns raised by Canadian Muslims’ 
experiences. Without addressing the underlying conditions, there is no reason to 
expect change. There is currently no mechanism other than public pressure to compel 
the political action necessary to reform CSIS and the RCMP. As a result, rights 
violations should be expected, and the lack of trust among Canadian Muslims is likely 
to remain as long as national security operations focus on that community.192 
 
The lack of meaningful transparency and accountability in Canada’s security 
agencies was a major issue in the public deliberations concerning the ATA 2015, as 
analysts worried that the security agencies were being strengthened without adequate 
public oversight and without external policy advice,193 contributing to the echo 
chamber problem within security circles.  The lack of external influence or oversight 
of security operations appeared to disregard the key recommendations of the Arar 
Commission and others. This left internal failings, illegal action, and abuses of 
authority to come to light only as a result of extraordinary accountability measures, 
such as public inquiries, independent investigations, and court trials. These venues, 
which do not have the authority to implement reform, have served to expose national 
security abuses to the public. While lifting the veil on official misconduct is valuable, 
the lack of meaningful follow-up and the continued perception of impunity for 
illegality has no doubt been the biggest contributor to waning trust and worsening 
vulnerability for Canadian Muslims. 
 
 
IV.  Experiences of Canadian Muslims with counter-terrorism 
 
Until very recently, there were only anecdotal reports about the perspectives of 
ordinary Canadian Muslims in relation to Canada’s counter-terrorism strategy. In 
2016, Lenard and Nagra published ground-breaking research with the support of 
Canada’s Department of Public Safety, evaluating the impact of counter-terrorism 
measures on the Canadian Muslim community.194 Their study reveals high levels of 
distrust and fear of Canada’s national security agencies within the community most 
affected by counter-terrorism investigations. The findings are consistent with similar 
studies in other jurisdictions.195 This calls attention to the extent to which the public 
                                                 
191 Glen McGregor & Ian MacLeod, “RCMP Rewards Officers Involved in the Arar Case”, Ottawa Citizen 
(28 September 2006) A1. 
192 Arar Inquiry, supra note 9 at 357–58. 
193 Roach, False Security, supra note 15 at 3. 
194 Lenard & Nagra, supra note 23. 
195 See e.g. Aziz Z Huq, Tom R Tyler & Stephen J Schulhofer, “Mechanisms for Eliciting Cooperation in 
Counterterrorism Policing: Evidence from the United Kingdom” (2011) 8:4 J Empirical Leg Stud 728; 
2018] THE SPIES WHO HATE US 189 
discourse and policy have caused the Muslim population in the west to be “securitized” 
– that is, viewed primarily through a security-threat lens.196 The result of securitizing 
entire communities is that securitized populations live in fear of state officials, and 
face considerable social stigma and marginalization.197  
 
The researchers surveyed some 100 Muslim community leaders across 
Canada in September 2015.198 They found that Canadian Muslims have a strong sense 
that they are under official suspicion. Individuals expressed concern with being 
targeted by counter-terrorism measures and complained that their communities 
experience disadvantage as a result of the interference in private and public life caused 
by scrutiny and stigma perpetuated by government policy.199 They found that 
Canadian Muslims are fearful to freely engage in legitimate, constitutionally-protected 
expressive activity. Even ordinary acts, like googling a subject of interest or attending 
a public lecture, are regarded as potentially incriminating if misconstrued.200 There has 
also been a chill in charitable donations due to heightened scrutiny of Muslim charities 
under broad criminal definitions of terrorist financing, leading one respondent to 
conclude: “I have become less likely to contribute my money to [even] mainstream 
Muslim organizations.”201  
 
The researchers also found that, as a result of inadequate institutional 
transparency and oversight, Canadian Muslims are hyper-aware of their communities’ 
vulnerability to anti-terrorism excesses and breaches by state officials.202 Nearly a 
decade after the Arar Commission’s revelations, Canadian Muslim perceptions of anti-
terrorism suggests that little was done to address or mitigate that community’s 
legitimate fears of false or malicious targeting. Beyond individual rights violations, 
respondents worried about the long-term impact of marginalization and religious 
stigma on Muslim youth.203 Systemic rights violations that appear to occur with 
impunity can severely undermine trust between the state and minority communities. 
Some respondents drew the link between rights violations and radicalization. One 
interviewee stated, “Harper says he is trying to protect Canada from terrorism, but he’s 
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bringing terrorism to Canada by adopting these policies which marginalize minorities 
and encourages people to join terrorist groups.”204 
 
Respondents described a heightened vulnerability not only with respect to 
official scrutiny, but also in terms of social exclusion and hate crimes that result from 
public discourse aligning Muslims with terrorism.205 Canadian Muslims raised the 
concern that official counter-terrorism discourse legitimizes and invites anti-Muslim 
discrimination.206 Canadian Muslims brace themselves for “backlash” attacks and 
vandalism when stories of international terrorism hit headlines.207 Notwithstanding the 
subjective experiences of discrimination against Muslims, Bahdi’s review of human 
rights tribunal decisions across Canadian jurisdictions found little success for 
complaints of anti-Muslim discrimination.208 She grimly concludes that “the human 
rights system may be failing people, particularly those who face discrimination in the 
workplace, just as they need it the most.”209   
 
Lenard and Nagra drew special attention to the experiences of Canadian 
Muslims with the investigative strategies of CSIS, highlighting major concerns about 
targeting and surveillance. Respondents reported that CSIS recruited community 
members to spy on one another, routinely questioned community leaders, and put 
mosques under monitoring.210 In particular, respondents indicated that CSIS engaged 
in unethical practices, such as taking advantage of refugees, and harassing them to 
become CSIS informants. Some reported CSIS showing up to question them in an 
intimidating manner: at home, at night, in front of their kids, at work.211 Respondents 
said the “traumatic” visits caused “stress, panic and embarrassment”.212 
 
The aftermath of 9/11 was not the first time Canadian Muslims came under 
CSIS scrutiny. CSIS had previously experimented with a community interview 
program during the first Gulf War of 1990-91, seeking to gather information from 
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within Canada’s Arab population.213 The program was highly controversial and 
“revealed the extent to which security investigations could impact on community 
perceptions and generate a sense of unwarranted and divisive targeting.”214 That CSIS 
essentially revived the practice a decade later suggests either that the service’s 
directors did not know its recent history or did not worry about alienating entire ethnic 
or religious communities. Those interviewed by Lenard and Nagra reported that even 
though CSIS interviews were “voluntary”, individuals felt coerced into cooperating. 
An imam from Montreal stated that “many Muslims feel that if you don’t actually 
speak with security intelligence agencies or representatives of security intelligence 
agencies, it may cast suspicion on you.”215 Another respondent, a human rights lawyer 
in Ottawa, opined that, “the political leaders of our community feel if [they] don’t step 
up… they’ll become a target or a suspect. So in order to allay suspicion they will do 
what they need to do to help CSIS.”216  
 
It is thus not surprising that over the same period of time that Canada 
strengthened its alignment and cooperation with US counter-terrorism policy and 
objectives, the Canadian Muslim population experienced significant insecurity in 
Canadian society. Muslim vulnerability to false accusations, erroneous suspicion, 
wrongful investigation, and discrimination is well documented.217 Muslims living in 
North America could not seem to shake the persistent suspicion that they and their 
institutions were sympathetic to, if not complicit in, threats against the west. Part of 
the problem was the framing of the conflict: the US and Canada had both characterized 
the nature of the terrorist threat not only in terms of violence, but also in terms of 
values.218  
 
It is precisely this kind of divisive discourse that galvanized Canadian 
Muslim political participation in the 2015 election. Scholars note that “political 
mobilization is a direct response to the degree of threat and discrimination that a group 
experiences.”219 Two post-election surveys reported voter turnout of nearly 8 in 10 
among Canadian Muslims, significantly exceeding, for the first time in history, 
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Canada’s overall voter turnout rate of 68.5 per cent.220 In a study of Canadian Arab 
youth, researchers found that Canadian counter-terrorism strategy and election 
rhetoric was perceived to promote Islamophobia and caused Arab youth to feel 
“racialized and securitized”.221 This had the effect of undermining the tendency in this 
demographic to be politically apathetic, and increased their interest in engaging with 
politics. Greater political engagement by Muslims and Arabs, especially among young 
people, increased exposure to politicians and policy makers and brought more focused 
attention to the perspectives of Canadian Muslim civil society. 
 
It appeared that an opening was presented by the Trudeau government’s 
commitment to making representation and diversity a government priority.222 While 
Trudeau maintained the previous government’s approach to national security broadly 
speaking, it shifted to a very different public discourse about the nature of the threats 
and what is acceptable in combatting terrorism. The question that remained 
unanswered is this: What influence, if any, does a change in political leadership and 
discourse have on the attitudes and manner in which the individuals within the 
agencies charged with counter-terrorism perform their duties? The answer to this 
question remains to be seen. 
 
 
V.  Legislating Reform 
 
This article has thus far argued that, immediately after 9/11, Canada adopted a counter-
terrorism strategy that produced errors and misjudgements leading to Canadian 
complicity in torture abroad, as found by two commissions of inquiry. The subsequent 
failure to meaningfully address root causes and implement recommendations for 
national security reform produced a generation of Canadian Muslims that felt deeply 
distrusted by, and were deeply distrustful of, the agencies in charge of preventing 
terrorism. Research summarized above indicates that the agencies continue to suffer 
from a lack of credibility within Muslim communities, frustrating cooperation and 
perpetuating the social vulnerability of members of that community. The allegations 
contained in the 2017 civil claim against CSIS appear to corroborate concerns that 
CSIS’s internal culture produces bigotry and bias in operations, raising the likelihood 
that it will continue to engage in discriminatory and illegal action. This bodes ill for 
future effectiveness in Canadian counter-terrorism, which requires functioning, 
trusting relationship-building with stakeholder communities. 
 
Indeed, in 2012, the Conservative government released Canada’s first new 
national security policy in nearly a decade, emphasizing for the first time the idea of 
citizen partnership in fighting terrorism.223 Government, CSIS, and the RCMP all 
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seemed to embrace a “community policing” model – the idea that the key to national 
security prevention lies within the targeted (i.e. Muslim) communities.224 This was 
consistent with the traditionally conservative American response to terrorism, namely 
that citizens should take ownership of the security burden through a “responsibility to 
act”, which includes a duty to actively cooperate with the authorities – by reporting on 
neighbours, for example – to help root out security threats.225 Maintaining a high 
degree of trust within communities is essential to the success of this kind of policing. 
The problem was that neither the Harper government nor Canada’s national security 
agencies had sufficient credibility within Canadian Muslim communities to build a 
cooperative relationship.226 For Canadian Muslims, the federal government and the 
national security establishment were not just tainted by past errors and miscarriages of 
justice; the prime minister himself was widely perceived to be openly hostile to 
Canadian Muslims,227 while objectively doing little if anything to address the 
community’s sense of vulnerability and isolation.  
 
When the ATA 2015 was introduced as Bill C-51 on January 30, 2015, it had 
received virtually no public input. It was the product of an opaque government policy-
making process,228 and appeared to be driven by an ideological response to global 
events. Prime Minister Harper said that the “government understands that extreme 
jihadists have declared war on us, on all free people, and on Canada specifically”, and 
pledged not to “privilege the so-called rights of terrorists and others who would harm 
Canadians over the rights of law-abiding citizens.”229 Indeed, the new law appeared to 
have been designed primarily to give CSIS the power to act with greater latitude, while 
giving the government more freedom to share information across agencies and 
departments. Because the government presented the proposed legislation as a 
necessary and urgent response to global Islamic extremism, it was understood that 
Canadian Muslims would be most significantly impacted.   
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At the same time, Bill C-51 raised alarm bells across a spectrum of interests, 
from gun owners to First Nations.230 It was roundly criticized by legal experts and 
advocacy groups for its confusing complexity and the expected chilling effect on 
constitutional rights.231 It created the new offence of advocating or promoting the 
commission of terrorism offences in general, which was viewed as a potentially 
dangerous incursion on free speech. This moved beyond the traditional categories of 
criminal speech – incitement, conspiracy, threats, and counselling – to potentially 
capture speech far removed from any connection to terrorism. It created unprecedented 
new “kinetic” powers for CSIS to use in threat reduction and disruption. It authorized 
virtually any action by CSIS agents, with the only explicit limitation being actions 
which lead to “death, bodily harm, the perversion of justice or violation of sexual 
integrity” or which violate core international human rights.232 The law even authorized 
Federal Court judges to issue warrants permitting CSIS to violate the Charter and to 
ignore local laws in foreign operations. The law left the contentious no-fly list in place 
with inadequate redress for falsely listed individuals, estimated to number around 
100,000, including many children.233 It also lowered the evidentiary bar for law 
enforcement officers wishing to detain individuals suspected of planning to commit a 
terrorist act. The law broadened the definition of “threats to the security of Canada” 
well beyond the existing definition of “terrorist activities”, which many feared could 
include any form of advocacy or protest that was not authorized by law. Pipeline 
protestors and “Occupy” demonstrators would be turned into “terrorists”.  
 
In July 2015, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association (CCLA) and Canadian 
Journalists for Freedom of Expression (CJFE) brought a legal challenge arguing that 
the law would chill expressive freedom, threaten privacy, authorize illegal police 
action, and was lacking effective oversight.234 While the Trudeau Liberals had 
supported legislating the ATA 2015, the new prime minister promised to consult with 
the public and with civil society to revisit some of the legislation’s more “problematic” 
aspects.235  
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In September 2016, the government released a discussion paper, Our 
Security, Our Rights,236 and the Minister for Public Safety engaged in country-wide 
consultations to discuss proposed amendments to the ATA 2015. Critics continued to 
worry that the approach outlined in the Green Paper remained tethered to the C-51 
mindset. The federal Privacy Commission complained that the “tone of the 
Government’s discussion… focuses heavily on the challenges for law enforcement 
and national security agencies”, while downplaying concern for democratic rights, 
privacy, and freedom of expression.237  
 
When Bill C-59,238 or the National Security Act, 2017, was introduced in June 
2017, it was welcomed as an improvement over the ATA 2015 in a few respects: the 
“advocating or promoting” provision was revised into a more traditional “counselling” 
offence;239 the power of CSIS to break the law was further circumscribed; and, the 
evidentiary threshold for detention without charge when it comes to preventing a 
terrorist act was raised from “likely” to “necessary”.240 It also, importantly, proposed 
to create a new National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA), which 
would operate as an integrated oversight body. This was one of the key 
recommendations from the Arar Report that had been ignored for more than a decade. 
According to Wark, Bill C-59 was to be commended for its proposal to “redraw the 
entire landscape of national security review and accountability”.241 For Roach, Carvin, 
and Forcese, though not a perfect solution, “compared to C-51, C-59 does try to 
balance new security powers with new oversight and review regimes. It draws security 
powers into closer orbit around the rule of law, while increasing the prospect that when 
these powers are used they will be subject to independent scrutiny.”242 
 
Notwithstanding improvements, those concerned with privacy and civil 
liberties worried that, at its core, Bill C-59 would still legitimize anti-democratic 
conduct, including mass surveillance, state-sponsored hacking, data-mining, the use 
of information obtained through torture, and racial and religious profiling. Meanwhile, 
it maintained CSIS’ ability to physically disrupt threats. It also continued to authorize 
detention without charge, which could include denial of the right to counsel or appeal 
for habeas corpus, contrary to the rule of law, the Charter, and Canada’s international 
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treaty obligations.243 Even the proposed oversight agency suffered deficiencies.244 In 
an open letter delivered to key government ministers in September 2017, a group of 
individuals and civil society organizations, including Amnesty International, the 
Canadian Civil Liberties Association, the Canadian Muslim Lawyers Association, and 
PEN Canada, expressed their disappointment that C-59 was “not the fundamental 
change needed to undo C-51’s legacy, nor to fully realize and respect that human rights 
must sit at the core of our national security framework.”245 Dozens of experts and civil 
society actors appeared at the House Standing Committee on Public Safety and 
National Security (SECU) calling for a more substantial overhaul of the ATA 2015. On 
April 25, 2018, the standing committee adopted the Bill with only minor amendments 
and, on May 3, 2018, presented the Bill to the House of Commons. 
 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Canada’s current counter-terrorism strategy, Building Resilience Against Terrorism, 
is premised on a “fundamental belief that countering terrorism requires partnerships”, 
not only within and across government agencies, but also with civil society and 
citizens,246 which is described as an essential tool in the Prevent strand of the strategy. 
Establishing and maintaining citizen partnership in counter-terrorism “requires law 
enforcement and CSIS to develop strong capabilities in community engagement, 
including the enhanced language and cultural awareness skills needed to engage with 
diverse Canadian communities.”247 
 
If trust and cooperation with targeted communities are seen to be a necessary 
precondition to effective security, cooperation also offers the benefit of potentially 
bolstering counter-radicalization and re-integration efforts. On the other hand, 
aggressive counter-terrorism investigations (such as home visits, spying on mosques, 
etc.) can cast a wide net of suspicion and treats members of the targeted communities 
not as partners, but as objects of fear and subjects of investigation. Profiling 
communities also fans the flames of bigotry and exposes a vulnerable population to 
greater discrimination. Given the facts surveyed in this article, it appears that the 
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Canadian security establishment – in particular, CSIS – remains institutionally 
incapable of fulfilling its mandate without first repairing its approach to dealing with 
Canadian Muslims. The track record of official Islamophobia presents an internal 
crisis in Canadian counter-terrorism that requires prioritization and policy attention. 
The lack of trust not only perpetuates Canadian Muslim insecurity and social 
exclusion, but it also diminishes the potential effectiveness of Canada’s national 
security strategy, negatively affecting all Canadians.  
 
It seems likely that, as long as Canadian counter-terrorism priorities remain 
tethered to post-9/11 counter-terrorism discourse that posits Islam and Muslims as 
primary threats, the burdens of social exclusion and unfair vulnerability will continue. 
It remains a structural paradox that Canadian Muslims are presumptively expected to 
shoulder a higher cost for security while simultaneously being equally vulnerable to 
terror attacks. The rise of militant white supremacist groups, along with increased 
attacks against Muslims,248 including the January 2017 Quebec City mosque 
massacre,249 bring this paradox into sharper focus. The reality that Canadian Muslims 
are more often victims than threats highlights the imperative to bring evidence-based, 
rationally-grounded, and culturally competent ethical and legal perspectives to the 
leadership and ranks of Canada’s national security institutions. The legacy of abuse 
presents too extensive a record to ignore any longer.
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